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ABSTRACT 
Public-private sectoral wage differentials have been studied extensively using quantile 
regression techniques. These typically find large public sector premiums at the bottom 
of the wage distribution. This may imply that low skill workers are ‘overpaid’, prompting 
concerns over efficiency. We note several other potential explanations for this result 
and explicitly test whether the premium varies with skill, using Australian data. We use 
a quasi-differenced GMM panel data model which has not been previously applied to 
this topic,  internationally.  Unlike other available methods, this  technique  identifies 
sectoral differences in returns to unobserved skill. It also facilitates a decomposition of 
the wage gap into components explained by differences in returns to all (observed and 
unobserved) skills and by differences in their stock. We find no evidence to suggest that 
the premium varies with skill. One interpretation is that the compressed wage profile of 
the public sector induces the best workers (on unobserved skills) to join the public 
sector in low wage occupations, vice versa in high wage occupations. We also estimate 
the average public sector premium to be 6% for women and statistically insignificant 
(4%) for men.  
JEL classification codes: J45, J31, J38 
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I  INTRODUCTION 
In developed countries, the distributions of  wages in the public sector  are typically more 
condensed than in the private sector (see for example the review of Gregory and Borland 1999; 
and cross-national evidence from Lucifora and Muers 2006). Studies using quantile regressions 
and quantile regression decompositions find that this is not fully explained by the mix of ‘skill’ 
(proxied by education and years of experience) in the two sectors (Birch 2006; Blackaby et al. 
1998; Cai and Liu 2011; Gregory and Borland 1999; Lucifora and Muers 2006; Melly 2005; Mueller 
1998). A typical finding across countries and sexes is that public sector workers at the bottom of 
the wage distribution receive a large pay premium (holding education and experience constant), 
whilst public sector workers near the top of the wage distribution receive a wage penalty, or a 
small premium. Such results motivate concerns that low-skill public sector workers are overpaid, 
resulting in public sector inefficiency, whilst high-skill public sector workers are underpaid, leading 
to difficulties in retainment (Birch 2006; Lucifora and Muers 2006; Mueller 1998). These concerns 
assume that the quantile regression findings reflect a public sector wage premium that varies with 
skill. In other words, the public sector may provide lower overall returns to skill (whilst paying a 
premium that is independent of skill). But there are other possible explanations for the quantile 
regression results. There may be greater variation in private sector wages for each given level of 
skill  (Bender 2003).  It is also  possible that in this context, education and experience are 
inadequate proxies of skill which bias the results (we expand on this suggestion below). The 
source of these results has major implications for assessing public sector efficiency as well as for 
interpreting the effect of public sector employment on the distribution of wages. Are low skill 
public sector workers overpaid, whilst high skill public sector workers are underpaid? Our primary 
aim in this paper is to examine explicitly whether the public sector wage premium varies with skill.  
We  feel  that  insufficient  consideration  has been given in this literature to the role  of 
‘unobservables’ in the sorting of workers into sectors. In most studies, experience and education 
are the only proxies for skill. To illustrate the possible implication of this, consider the notion that 
workers with little experience or education are better paid in the public sector than in the private 
sector, vice versa for more educated and experienced workers. This is implicit in the results of 
studies which estimate separate wage equations for each sector  which  find that returns to 
education and earnings are lower in the public sector (see the review by Bender 1998; and recent 
evidence for Australia in Birch 2006). But economic theory (and common sense) suggests that less 
educated and inexperienced workers would hence prefer to work in the public sector, vice versa 
for more educated and experienced workers. If employers (in hiring, firing and  promotions) 
observe better indicators of skill than are available to econometricians, the standard quantile 3 
 
regression results may be partially (or completely) explained by bias due to sector selection. There 
are many such indicators of skill available to employers, even at the stage of recruitment. These 
include the relevance of qualifications (field of study), the quality of the institution of study, 
relevance of work experience (firms and industries worked for), proxies of intelligence and work 
ethic (school grades), interpersonal skills (observed during the interview) and so on. Thus it is 
conceivable that the lower public sector returns to observables are offset by sector sorting on 
unobservables, due to the information that is available to employers (but not econometricians). 
This argument concords with the  corresponding union wage effects  literature.  Reviewing the 
empirical evidence, Card et al. (2004) argue that failure to account for unobserved characteristics 
leads to overstating the extent to which union wage effect varies with skill (see also Card 1996). 
Selectivity corrections would seem to be a potential solution to this problem. These have been 
used extensively in the related literature on decomposing the mean wage premium (Gregory and 
Borland 1999). They have also been attempted in a quantile regression context (Melly 2006). 
However, selectivity corrections have major limitations in this context. They cannot differentiate 
between sectoral differences in the stock of unobserved skills from sectoral differences in returns 
to such skills. They do not, therefore, facilitate Oaxaca-type decompositions which treat observed 
and unobserved skills symmetrically  (Gyourko and Tracy 1988; Neuman and Oaxaca 2004). 
Secondly, there appears to be a lack of credible exclusion restrictions to implement such 
methods.
1
Here, we address these issues through an alternate approach. We  implement an estimator 
proposed by Lemieux (1993; 1998), using Australian data. This is a quasi-differenced panel data 
model, estimated by GMM. To our knowledge, it  is the only available estimator that  fully 
 Further, sector selection is a non standard selection problem, since workers select 
from a set of potential employers and vice versa (see Card 1996; Farber 1983 in the related 
context of union status). Fixed effects quantile regressions have also been developed (Bargain and 
Melly 2008). But they too do not allow for differences in returns to unobservables. 
                                                           
1  Some have used father’s sector of employment as an exclusion restriction (e.g. Bender, 2003; Dustmann 
and van Soest, 1998; Hartog and Oosterbeek, 1993; Hou, 1993; Melly, 2006; Terrell, 1993). Such estimates 
are biased if intergenerationally transmitted attitudes to public sector employment are correlated with 
intergenerationally transmitted (unobserved) skills. Others have used attitudes towards unions (eg. Bender, 
2003; Heitmeuller, 2006; Melly, 2006), which  are likely to be endogenous to working in a unionised 
environment. Some use parent’s education (Hartog and Oosterbeek, 1993; Hou, 1993), which is also likely 
to be correlated with unobserved skills. Others have used age (Borland et al., 1998; Kanellopoulos, 1997). 
But age is correlated with risk aversion (Halek and Eisenhauer, 2001; Pålsson, 1996), which may be 
rewarded differently in the two sectors (Gregory and Borland, 1999).  4 
 
disentangles returns from stocks of all (observed and unobserved) skills and it has not been 
applied to this topic before. In our adaptation, we use a single index of (latent) skill. Our main 
interest is in whether returns to this concept of skill vary between sectors. We find no evidence of 
differences in returns. This conforms to our expectations of sector sorting  on unobserved 
characteristics and it informs the interpretation of established quantile regression results. We also 
decompose the average wage gap into the components explained by returns and stocks of (all) 
skills. We estimate a positive average public sector premium for women and an insignificant 
positive premium for men. 
The estimator is discussed in Section II. The data source is the Household Income and Labour 
Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) panel survey, which is described in Section III. Section IV presents 
results, including estimated parameters, a decomposition of the raw average wage gap, sensitivity 
tests and comparisons with other estimators. Section V offers conclusions. 
 
II  METHODS 
The model is adapted from Lemieux (1993, 1998), who used a similar approach to estimate the 
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 The intuition of the model is in some respects similar to that of a first-
difference model. The key parameters are estimated by sector movers and sector choice can be 
correlated with (unobserved) characteristics. The main innovation of Lemieux’s approach is that 
unlike all other approaches used for this topic, it accounts for differences between sectors in 
returns to unobserved characteristics. The method is centred around a single wage equation of 
the following form: 
 
    (1) 
The wage observed for employee i at time t is a function of sector (P = 1 if the employee is in the 
public sector and zero otherwise), job characteristics (X), a single (latent) index of skill (θ) and an 
idiosyncratic error. The coefficient δ
 
represents a constant public sector premium, independent 
of skill. Returns to skills are allowed to differ between sectors through ψ . If ψ = 1, returns to skills 
are equal across sectors. If ψ < 1, returns to skills are systematically lower in the public sector that 
the private sector, which would imply that any public sector wage premium is smaller for high skill 
workers than for low skill workers, vice versa if ψ > 1. Our main interest is thus to test whether ψ 
= 1. The only job characteristics (X) of interest are those which attract compensation for working 
                                                           
2 See also Gibbons et al. (2005) who use a similar approach in the context of industry wage models. 5 
 
conditions (such as shift work, or an absence of job security or leave entitlements). Returns to 
such job characteristics (β) are also allowed to differ by sector, with the superscripts P and R 
denoting returns in the public and private sectors, respectively. 
A  Decomposition of the Raw Sectoral Wage Gap 
If estimable, the parameters in (1) can be used in a decomposition of the raw average wage gap, 
which distinguishes between the effects of differences in the stock of skills and job characteristics 
as well as the effects of differences in returns to both skills and job characteristics. Consider the 
mean wage difference between sectors: 
ln( ) ln( ) ( ) ( )
PP RR
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P X X X θ θ β θ ψ β β δ − + − + − + − + =   (2) 
The contents of the first square brackets represent the effects of differences in wage setting 
policies, which includes a constant difference (δ ) and differences in returns to characteristics. 
The second term represents the effects of differences in characteristics. 
B  Estimation
3
The first step to estimate (1) is to ‘quasi-difference’ the wage equation. That is, to substitute θ for 
the expression obtained when θ is made the subject of the argument in a first lag as follows:  
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3 Analysis was conducted using SAS V9 and Stata V11. 6 
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Equation (4) is nonlinear and includes an endogenous regressor:  1 ln − it w , which is correlated with 
1 − it ε
 
and hence with  it e . It would seem natural for  1 ln − it w  to be instrumented by  2 ln − it w , which 
is available for this study. However, the likely serial correlation between  2 it ε −  and 1 − it ε  renders 
2 ln − it w  an invalid instrument. This is because the sample (described in Section III) is restricted to 
job changers between t-1 and t, most of whom did not also change jobs between t-2 and t-1. 
Given that ε’ will include a job-specific component, the correlation between  2 it ε −  and 1 − it ε  will be 
greater than between  1 − it ε
 
and  it ε . As such,  2 ln − it w
 
will also be correlated with  it e . 
An alternative instrument is the interaction of the lagged and unlagged sector indicators:  1 − it it P P . 
The complete sector history indicators described by Lemieux (1998) are equivalent to the three 
sector variables:  it P ,  1 it P − and  1 − it it P P . The validity of  1 − it it P P
 
as an instrument follows from the 
assumed exogeneity of  it P and  1 it P − . The relevance of  1 − it it P P
 
as an instrument for  1 ln − it w  results 
from the correlation between  1 − it it P P
 
and  i θ . In other words,  1 − it it P P
 
is a relevant instrument if 
the average skill of public sector joiners is different to the average skill of public sector leavers 
(see Lemieux 1993: Appendix 1 for further discussion of these issues). Since  i θ is not observed, 
this is difficult to test.
4
1 − it X
 However, an approximate alternative is to test whether the average wage 
of joiners is different to that of leavers (averaged across their public and private sector 
observations). The three sector variables are also interacted with   and  it X  to create further 
instruments. 
Equation (4) can be estimated efficiently by GMM. The GMM estimator minimises the following 
objective function: 
) ( ) ( α α e Z ZW e ′ ′  
where the weighting matrix W is the inverse of the estimated variance matrix of the moment 
functions, estimated by NLIV (see Davidson and MacKinnon 1993; Greene 2003; Hansen 1982). 
In order to separately identify 
R
t δ , 
R
t 1 − δ and δ , it is necessary to impose a further restriction on 
the parameters. The mean value of θ across all people and both years is constrained to be zero: 
                                                           
4 In linear IV, instrument relevance can be determined by testing the significance of the instrument(s) in the 
first stage regression. This is not the case for nonlinear GMM (see Stock et al., 2002). 7 
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This restriction involves the sum of a nonlinear function across the entire sample. However, it can 
be easily imposed by noting that the denominator of this expression can only take two values: 1 
and ψ. 
C  Identification 
The estimates of δ  and ψ are identified only by movers between sectors. This can be seen by 
noting that both disappear from (4) when 1 − = it it P P . Thus reasonable estimates of δ  and ψ can 
only be obtained with a data set that has a sufficiently large number of movers. 
Similarly, the coefficients of X in each sector (β
P and β
R) are only independently identified by 
people whose X changes between t-1 and t. In the present application, only job characteristics are 
included in X. In principle, observed time varying human capital variables could also be included in 
X. Consider the standard human capital variables: experience and education. Sectoral differences 
in returns to education could be identified by individuals (in each sector) whose educational 
attainment changed between observations. In  the case of experience, the main issue for 
identification is the ability to distinguish it’s effect from that of pure wage inflation or other 




t 1 − −δ δ ). The returns to 
experience could thus be identified by the set of people whose experience increased by less than 
the time elapsed between observations. 
An alternate identification strategy is used in this paper. Education can be treated as time 
invariant if people whose highest educational qualification changed between t-1 and t (of whom 
there are very few as shown in the following section) are excluded from the analysis. Education 
can thus be incorporated as a component of θ, and differences in returns to education can be 
incorporated in ψ. This highlights a key difference between this model and standard panel data 
models. In a FE model, leaving education in θ implies an assumption of no sectoral differences in 
returns to education. This is not the case here. Thus differences in time invariant skills (including 
education) are identified by movers between sectors.  One advantage of this identification 
strategy is that it does not require any education  changers.  By  leaving education in θ, the 8 
 
approach also avoids several other problems characteristic of the standard panel data approach. 
These include the assumptions that returns to education are immediate rather than lagged and 
that  returns to education for students who simultaneously  work are representative of  all 
employees. It also avoids ambiguity over whether the highest level of educational qualification is 
the appropriate human capital measure, or whether the total quantity of education (in years) is 
more appropriate.  A consequence  of this strategy is that sectoral differences in returns to 
education are not separately identified from differences in returns to other time invariant skills. 
A similar strategy is available to incorporate the effects of experience. Since the two observations 
are only one year apart, experience is almost completely  time invariant  and can thus be 
incorporated into θ , similarly to the treatment of education. The effect of the last one year 




t 1 − −δ δ .
5
D  Exogenous Switching Assumption 
 
The model relies on the assumption that sector choice is uncorrelated with e, conditional on X 
and θ. It allows sector selection to be correlated with θ. But it does not allow for the possibility 
that workers switch sectors due to changes in person and sector specific productivity (i.e. time-
varying comparative advantage). Lemieux argues that this problem is reduced by considering only 
involuntary job changers. These were people who changed jobs due to ‘plant  closing, family 
responsibilities, illness, geographic moves, dismissal, or other forms of layoffs’. This is 
problematic.  Workers  may be dismissed or laid off precisely due to a fall in sector-specific 
productivity (especially if institutional constraints prevent a wage reduction). Even if an 
involuntary job loss is assumed exogenous, there is no reason to believe that subsequent sector 
choice is unaffected by time-varying comparative advantage. Thus we do not follow Lemieux’s 
approach of limiting the sample to the set of involuntary job changers. In any case, the number of 
                                                           
5 It is acknowledged that the effect of a one year increase in experience may differ across the experience 
distribution, as reflected by the standard practice of including experience in quadratic form in wage 
equations (Mincer, 1974; Preston, 1997). It would be possible to include experience in quadratic form in the 
wage equation here. This is not pursued for a number of reasons. First, such an inclusion would make the 
interpretation of ψ  more difficult. In the preferred model, ψ facilitates a simple assessment of whether 
differences in returns to skills differ between sectors. Second, the nonlinearity in returns to experience 
would only be identified through an increase in one year of experience for each employee. To reiterate the 
nature of this restriction, it assumes that returns to the last single year of experience do not vary across 
experience levels. However, there is no restriction to the functional form of returns to all previous years of 
experience. This restriction is thus unlikely to be of any substantive consequence. 9 
 
job changers who report changing jobs involuntarily is too small in HILDA to adopt this approach, 
as it would reduce the sample size by approximately 75%. 
Instead,  we provide empirical support  (in the next section) for the  exogenous switching 
assumption. The rationale  is based on the following arguments.  If time-varying comparative 
advantage were an important factor in sector switching, one would expect to find an apparent 
public sector premium for public sector joiners and a corresponding private sector premium for 
public sector leavers. In other words, switching sectors would be associated with an increased 
wage, regardless of the direction of the switch. With purely exogenous switching, one would 
expect to see a public sector premium (or penalty) that does not depend on the direction of the 
switch (public to private or private to public). This is indeed what we find in the data. Next, even if 
time-varying comparative advantage were an important factor in sector switches, it would only 
bias the key results in specific circumstances. The mean public sector premium would be biased 
up (down) only to the extent that the number of public sector joiners (leavers) in the sample 
dominate the number  of leavers (joiners). A similar argument holds for ψ.  Time-varying 
comparative advantage would lead to downward bias in ψ only to the extent that public sector 
leavers are concentrated at the top of the skill distribution (relative to joiners), vice versa for an 
upward bias. Whilst the distribution of θ is not attainable, the wage distribution of leavers and 
joiners (averaged across their public and private sector observations) is arguably a close substitute 
in the present context. We will show that this distribution is similar for leavers and joiners. 
E  Factors Not Included in the Model 
Some factors that may affect sectoral wage differences have not been incorporated in the model 
and need to be taken into account when interpreting the results. In particular, earnings are an 
incomplete measure of the total return to labour. Employees may be willing to accept lower 
earnings in exchange for other benefits. Superannuation and paid maternity leave entitlements 
may be important considerations and both are more generous in the public sector. 
Employer contributions to superannuation are a major component of total remuneration. Under 
the Superannuation Guarantee, employers have been required to contribute to each employee’s 
superannuation at a rate equal to at least 9% of earnings since 2002. Historically, superannuation 
in the public sector has been generous. The Commonwealth Superannuation Scheme commenced 
in 1922, providing some public sector retirees with a defined benefit pension equal to up to 70% 
of their final salary, indexed to inflation  (Department of Finance and Administration 2001). 
Subsequent reforms have resulted in less generous pensions. If superannuation schemes remain 
more generous in the public sector, this may have a downward effect on public sector earnings 10 
 
through a compensating wage differential. However, sectoral comparisons of employer 
contributions are hampered by differences in the benefit structures of superannuation schemes. 
Schemes fall into three main structures: accumulation, defined benefits and a hybrid of the two. 
In accumulation funds, employers contribute superannuation continuously, in proportion to 
earnings. In defined benefit funds, the value of employer contributions is unknown at the time 
that wages are earned because the benefits are often defined in relation to employees’ final 
salary. For this reason, the major recent survey of superannuation in Australia, the Survey of 
Employment Arrangements and Superannuation (SEAS), only provides a measure of employer 
contributions for those who have active accumulation funds (and no defined benefit or hybrid 
accounts) (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2001). This excludes 63% of public sector employee 
respondents and 15% of those in the private sector. For the remaining sample, average employer 
contributions are similar in the two sectors (6.6% in the public sector and 6.8% in the private 
sector).
6
Paid maternity leave was not mandatory In Australia until January 2011 (after the period of data 
coverage used here). In the pre-2011 era at least, public sector employers were much more likely 
to provide paid maternity leave than private sector employers. In 2005, the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics surveyed women who had a child under two years of age. Of those who were public 
sector employees whilst pregnant, 76% accessed paid maternity leave, compared to 27% in the 
private sector (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2007: 135). HILDA includes data on paid maternity 
leave entitlement. But it is poorly reported, with missing values recorded for approximately 40% 
of females in the sample used here, most of whom did not know whether they were entitled. Paid 
maternity leave may have a downward effect on public sector wages for females to the extent 
that they are willing to sacrifice some earnings in order to access this benefit. See Edwards (2006) 
for recent evidence of a compensating wage differential associated with paid maternity leave in 
Australia.  
  This is unlikely to be a good indication of the overall generosity of employer 
contributions in the public sector. It does suggest, however, that few private sector employees 
receive more than the minimum legislated contribution from their employer. 
                                                           
6  Author’s calculations from the SEAS Expanded Confidentialised Unit Record File. The percentage 
contribution was calculated by the author for each employee as total employer contributions divided by 
usual weekly income from main job. The sample was restricted to employees, excluding employees of own 
business. People with more than one job were excluded as the employer contribution variable does not 
differentiate between jobs. At the time of the survey, the minimum legislated employer contribution was 
8%. Employees with monthly income below $450 per month are exempt, as are those under 18 years of age 
working less than 30 hours per week. Thus it is reasonable for the average contribution to be less than 8%. 11 
 
There may also be sectoral differences in job security and flexibility and differences in the utility 
derived from the work itself. Such factors would induce compensating wage differentials in less 
attractive jobs. These are only partly measured by the casual status variable (which will capture 
some of the effects of job instability) and the shiftwork variable (which will capture the 
compensation paid for the disutility of shift work), as discussed in the following section.  No 
controls are included for industry and occupation. This implies an assumption that the industries 
and occupations of jobs in one sector are not generally less appealing compared to the other 
sector, in the sense that they detract from utility directly. Some supporting evidence for this 
assumption is presented in the following sections. It is shown in Section IV that the inclusion of 
industry and occupation controls in related models makes almost no difference to the estimates. 
Further, there is no evidence of sectoral differences in work stress and work satisfaction in 
Australia, as discussed in Section V. At a practical level, the samples in the preferred models are 
too small to accurately identify compensating differentials off movers between industries and 
occupations. 
We do not control for size of employer or union status. The public sector is a highly unionised 
workforce characterised by large employers. Both of these factors are associated with higher 
hourly earnings (Miller and Mulvey 1996; Wooden 2001). We treat these as inherent features of 
the public sector which we do not abstract from. Wooden (2001) has shown that in the Australian 
labour market, characterised by enterprise bargaining, the effect of unions on wages operates at 
the level of the workplace rather than the individual. Thus workers in highly unionised workplaces 
enjoy a wage premium, regardless of their personal union membership. Since HILDA does not 
include such data on the workplace, any attempt to explicitly account for the effect of 
unionisation is likely to be misleading.  
 
III  DATA 
The data used for this study are from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia 
(HILDA) Survey. HILDA is a nationally representative household-based panel survey, with annual 
observations taken since 2001, with an initial sample of 7682 households and 19,914 individuals. 
The analysis utilises all eight available waves (2001-2008). 
The estimation sample is defined as the set of employees who changed employers between any 
two consecutive observations (e.g. between Waves 1 & 2; or between Waves 2 & 3; and so on).
7
                                                           
7  Employees employed by their own business at either observation were excluded. 
 12 
 
The restriction to job changers is because sector of employment is self reported and thus may be 
measured with error.
8  Since only a small proportion of employees change sectors between 
consecutive years, a large proportion of apparent sector movers may be incorrectly identified due 
to reporting error. Indeed, preliminary analysis revealed that more than half of apparent sector 
movers did not report a change in employer in the  same period,  suggesting  that a large 
proportion of movers may be misclassified.
9
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of hourly earnings. Hourly earnings are derived as 
‘current weekly gross wage and salary in main job’ divided by ‘hours per week usually worked in 
main job’. Wage inflation is accounted for by scaling observed wages in each year by gender-
specific full time ordinary time average weekly earnings to 2008 levels. 
 To address this issue, the sample is limited to those 
who reported a change in employer, which follows Lemieux’s (1998) approach. 
The only observed characteristics included in the model (X) are dummy variables for shift or 
irregular  work and for ‘casual’  employment contracts. The shift work variable captures any 
compensating wage differentials resulting from the disutility of shift work.
10
                                                           
8 Public sector employees are those who identified their employer as a ‘Government business enterprise or 
commercial statutory authority’ or ‘Other governmental organisation’. 
 The casual status 
variable  is included because the wages of ‘casual’ employees usually include a loading that 
compensates for a lack of entitlements received under other contracts. The size of such loadings, 
however, varies considerably, depending on the Award or enterprise agreement under which an 
employee is covered. Watson (2005)  notes a variation of 15% to 33.3% amongst enterprise 
bargaining agreement in the ACIRRT ADAM database between 1994-2002. The loading is also 
between 15% and 33% in most Awards, but is sometimes less than this and can be as high as 50% 
(Owens 2001). Furthermore, many self-identified casuals do not receive any loading at all 
(Wooden and Warren 2003). A manual adjustment to the wages of casual workers is considered 
infeasible, since it is unclear how large such an adjustment would need to be. Thus the size of the 
loading is estimated by the model. Secondly, it is possible that average casual loadings are 
9 There are, however, a number of other possible explanations. It may result from reporting errors in the 
change in employer variable, since this relies on retrospective recall. It is also possible for employees to 
change sector without changing employer. This is the case when a public corporation is privatised. In any 
case, the conservative approach is taken here, by limiting the sample to employees who reported a change 
in employer. 
10  Current work schedule is self-reported. Shift work is defined as any schedule other than a ‘regular 
daytime schedule’. Most employees classified as shift workers reported ‘A rotating shift (changes from days 
to evenings to nights)’; an ‘Irregular schedule’; or a ‘Regular Evening Schedule’. 13 
 
different between the two sectors. In the main set of estimates, however, the loading is 
constrained to be equal, because no significant difference is found between sectors when the 
parameter is allowed to vary. The results are not sensitive to this restriction as will be shown. 
Separate models are estimated for men and for women. Exclusions from the sample are detailed 
in Table 1. Observations were excluded due to missing data at either observation (missing wage, 
sector, highest educational qualification, casual or shift status). Observations were also excluded 
where  the real wage was recorded to have  changed by more than one log point between 
observations (i.e. by a factor of more than 2.72).  A small number of people whose highest 
educational qualification changed between observations were excluded to ensure that education 
is time invariant, as discussed in the previous section. The estimation sample consists of 2703 
men and 2520 women. 
The sector movers consist of 294 men and 461 women. These observations identify δ
 
and ψ.  
Casual status changed between observations for 741 men and 767 women. These records identify 
the estimated casual loading. Shift work status changed between observations for 628 men and 
663 women. These records identify the estimated compensation for shift work. 
Table  2  shows weighted means for the main  sample by sex and sector. It also facilitates 
comparisons of the characteristics of sector movers to that of the full sample. This table shows 
that the raw public-private difference in mean log wages is 0.14 for men and 0.23 for women. 
Public sector employees are much more likely to hold a degree or higher qualification and to work 
in professional occupations.  Amongst females, public sector employees  also have more 
experience, less so for men. Private sector employees are more likely to be employed in casual 
jobs and to work in shift work arrangements. It is also clear that sector movers are similar to the 
rest of the sample, with their mean characteristics lying between the public and private means on 
most measures. Approximately half of male job changers also changed occupation, regardless of 
sector. This proportion is slightly higher for male sector movers (57%). Amongst females, the 
proportion of sector changers who changed occupation was similar to that of job changers 
overall.  
Table 3 facilitates an evaluation of the extent to which sector movers resemble the set of all 
employees (not just job changers). It is based on Table 2, with the sample expanded to the set of 
all employees. The mean characteristics of sector movers are similar to that of all employees in 
most  regards. The main differences  are  that sector movers are less experienced (especially 
amongst males) and had worked for their employer for a shorter period (at t-1). Amongst males, 
they are also less likely to be ‘Managers’. 14 
 
The wage distribution of sector movers is compared to that of other groups in Figure 1 and Figure 
2. Figure 1 shows that the wage distribution of sector movers is very similar to that of all job 
changers, especially those in the public sector. Figure 2 shows that the wage distribution of sector 
movers is not strikingly different to that of all  employees  in  each sector either, perhaps 
resembling the private sector distribution slightly more than the public sector distribution.  
A slightly higher proportion of sector movers moved into the public sector rather than away from 
the public sector (60% of male sector movers and 57% of female sector movers). This is not 
surprising given that public sector workers are more experienced on average. There were no 
major changes in this proportion across the years included in the sample. 
It was suggested in Section II that an approximate test of instrument relevance is to test whether 
the mean wage of public sector leavers is different to that of joiners. The results of such tests are 
shown in Table 4, which shows the mean ln wage for public sector joiners and leavers, across both 
observations, so that both the public and private sector wage is included in the calculation for 
each employee. There is clear evidence that public sector leavers have a higher wage than public 
sector jointers amongst both males and females (a difference of 0.103 for males and 0.070 for 
females). These differences are statistically significant (p = 0.030 for males; p = 0.012 for females) 
which provides  evidence for instrument relevance  (see section II.B). If the male and female 
samples are pooled, the evidence is stronger still (p = 0.002). For this reason, the model is re-
estimated for a pooled sample of males and females as a robustness test. It will be shown that the 
three sets of results, that for men, women and overall are similar and that the key estimates for 
the pooled model lie in between that of the male and female models. 
The middle panel of Table 4 shows mean log wage changes leavers, joiners and job changers who 
did not change sector. Relative to job changers who did not change sector, the log wage of public 
sector joiners increased by a mean of 0.041. The corresponding change for leavers is a decrease of 
0.054. Thus endogenous sector switching does not appear to have empirical support in this 
application. Table 4 also shows the numbers of leavers and joiners in the sample, which are fairly 
similar. 
Figure 3 shows the wage distributions for leavers and joiners (averaged across their public and 
private sector observations). These are similar, strongly suggesting that leavers and joiners are 
similarly distributed across the skill distribution. The corresponding distributions by sex (not 
shown) are noisier, but lead to the same qualitative conclusion. 
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IV  RESULTS 
A  Parameter Estimates 
The  results of the GMM  estimation  are shown in  Table  5. There is no evidence of sectoral 
differences in returns to skills. A value of ψ that is less than 1 suggests that returns to skills are 
smaller in the public sector than the private sector. For males, ψ is estimated to be 0.954, while 
for females it is 1.118. In the pooled model it is 0.960. This parameter is not significantly different 
from 1 in any model. Thus there is no evidence to suggest that the size of the public sector wage 
premium depends on the level of skill. This important result is considered in more detail in Section 
V. 
The constant effect (δ ) of public sector employment on wages is estimated to be positive and 
small (0.044 for men and 0.042 for women). This parameter is statistically significant for men (p = 
0.038), and borders on significance for women (p = 0.073). The estimate is slightly higher in the 
pooled model across sexes (0.052) and is highly significant. 
Positive and statistically significant loadings for casual status are estimated for both sexes and in 
the pooled model. Compensation for shift work is not statistically significant. The coefficients of 
casual and shift were constrained to be equal across sectors in the results reported in, since Wald 
tests do not reject the hypothesis of equality across sectors for either parameter in any model. 
The results are not sensitive to these restrictions, as will be shown. 
The Hansen statistic, reported at the bottom of Table 5, facilitates partial tests of instrument 
validity in overidentified GMM models. It is equal to the minimised value of the objective function 
multiplied by the sample size. Under the null hypothesis the statistic follows a χ
2 distribution with 
degrees of freedom equal to the number of overidentifying restrictions, which is the difference 
between the number of instruments and the number of parameters (Hansen 1982). In the models 
estimated here, there are 14 overidentifying restrictions. In the male and pooled models the p-
values greatly exceed 0.05 and so the null hypothesis is not rejected. In the female model the p-
value is slightly less than the critical value (0.044). However this may simply result from parameter 
heterogeneity in the population, with the different instruments picking up various local averages. 
B  Decomposition of the Raw Wage Gap 
The decomposition results are shown in Table 6. The main result is that the average public sector 
wage premium is estimated to be positive but small for men (0.040), slightly larger for women 
(0.059), with the estimate from the pooled model lying between the two (0.048). Statistically, this 16 
 
estimate is significantly different from zero for women (p<0.001) and the pooled model (p<0.001), 
but not for men (p=0.072).
11
Returning to 
 The 95% confidence intervals are (-0.004, 0.083) for men, (0.029, 
0.089) for women and (0.022, 0.073) overall. These imply an average public sector wage premium 
of e
0.040 – 1 = 4.1% for men, e
0.059 – 1 = 6.1% for women and e
0.048 – 1 = 4.9% overall. 
Table  6, the  majority of the raw wage gap is explained by differences in 
characteristics. In particular, the largest component of the wage gap is accounted for by sectoral 
differences in the stock of time invariant skills (which include education, experience and 
unobserved characteristics). In each model, this is a positive effect, suggesting that the average 
public sector employee is more skilled than their private sector counterpart. This is consistent 
with Table 2, which shows that they are more educated and more experienced. Differences in 
casual and shiftwork status are not major factors. 
C  Robustness Tests 
This subsection considers the robustness of the results with respect to a number of modifications 
to the preferred model. As discussed by Stock et al.  (2002: 527), sensitivity to minor 
methodological changes is suggestive of weak identification  in nonlinear GMM models. The 
estimates of primary interest are δ  (the constant effect of public sector employment on wages), 
ψ (returns to skills in the public sector relative the private sector), and the total average effect of 
public sector employment on wages. These are shown for a range of alternate specifications in 
Table 7. 
The first set of results are for a model where returns to ‘casual’ and ‘shift’ are not constrained to 
be equal in the two sectors. These estimates are similar to that of the preferred model, though 
they are slightly less precise, reflecting the increase in the number of parameters estimated by 
the model. The constant effect δ  becomes statistically insignificant. As shown in the next two 
sets of results, if the models are estimated by NLIV or iterated GMM, the results are very similar 
to the preferred model. When sample weights are applied, the estimates also remain similar to 
the preferred model. 
                                                           
11 The results of the decomposition are a function of the estimated coefficients and the sample means. The 
standard errors of the decomposition take account of the variance-covariance matrix of the estimated 
parameter vector. They also take account of the standard errors on the sample means. They also account 
for the fact that the estimated mean time invariant characteristics of workers in each sector ( P θ and  R θ ) 
are functions of the estimated parameters and the sample means. 17 
 
In the next seven sets of results, the sample is restricted to job changers between any single pair 
of consecutive waves (e.g. between Waves 1 & 2 only). Thus the sample size is severely restricted 
to approximately one seventh of the main models. Consequently, the estimates vary between 
these models. It is clear, however, that the changes to the estimates are always within reasonable 
realms of sampling error (the majority of point estimates are within one standard error of those in 
the preferred model, almost all are within two standard errors, and all are within three standard 
errors). This constitutes strong support for the validity of inference for the main set of estimates. 
Thus the results are generally robust to the methodological modifications considered. 
The final set of results in  Table  7  was generated by estimating the quasi-differenced wage 
equation (equation 7) by nonlinear least squares, thereby ignoring the endogeneity of  1 ln − it w . 
The standard errors on these estimates are smaller than in the preferred model (especially for ψ), 
but they are qualitatively similar. Like in the preferred model, the estimates of δ  are small 
positives for both sexes and the estimates of ψ are not significantly different from 1. The average 
wage premiums are also positive, statistically significant and similar to the preferred model. 
D  Comparison with other Methods 
The estimated average public sector wage premiums are compared in Table 8 to corresponding 
estimates generated through other methods. 
The OLS and  Oaxaca decomposition models  are  estimated  using  observations for employees 
across all six waves of HILDA.
12 Observations are excluded if the real recorded wage was less that 
$5 per hour or more than $100 per hour. Control variables include experience, experience 
squared, highest educational qualification (6 dummy variables), casual status, shift work status, 
years with current employer, years in current occupation, occupation (46 dummy variables for 
men; 43 for women), proficiency in English (3 dummy variables), married, state or territory (7 
dummy variables) and remoteness (3 dummy variables).
13
Table  8
 The OLS and Oaxaca decomposition 
results do not differ greatly, suggesting that differences in returns to observed characteristics are 
not a major driver of the average wage differential. Using the similar data, Cai and Liu (2011) also 
estimated the average public wage premium using OLS and Oaxaca decompositions. Their 
estimates are lower than those in  , and are  in some cases negative. Much of this 
discrepancy is explained by their inclusion of control variables for employer size. 
                                                           
12 The decompositions were estimated using the user-written Stata module –oaxaca– (Jann, 2008) 
13 Industry dummies are not included due to the heavy industrial segregation of public sector employment. 18 
 
The fixed effects and first difference (full controls) models use the same variables and the same 
sample as the OLS model, with the following exceptions. Employees with only a single observation 
are excluded  from the fixed effects model. Employees without consecutive observations are 
excluded from the first difference model. Employees whose wage changed by more than one log 
point were also excluded in each model.  These results suggest that for both sexes, some of the 
apparent public sector wage premium may be explained by higher unobserved skills of public 
sector employees.
14
The next estimates are also generated using a first difference approach. Here, the set of control 
variables is limited to those in the preferred model and education changers are excluded. The 
results here are quite similar to the previous model, suggesting that the larger set of controls 
makes little difference to the estimates, thereby justifying their exclusion from our preferred 
model. 
 However, these estimates are likely to be subject to considerable attenuation 
bias due to reporting error in the sector variable, as discussed above in the description of the 
data. 
To examine the issue of attenuation bias, a third pair of first difference results is estimated with 
the sample limited to job changers (the same sample as the preferred model). For both sexes, the 
estimated wage premium is considerably larger than the previous estimate, which conforms to 
the hypothesised attenuation bias in the larger sample.  
The first difference model estimated on the job changer sample is equivalent to the preferred 
model with ψ restricted to equal 1. Since ψ is estimated to be close to 1, so it is unsurprising that 
the estimated average wage premiums are similar in the first difference models. 
 
V  CONCLUSION 
We have used an adaptation of Lemieux’s (1993, 1998) quasi-differenced panel data estimator to 
test whether the public sector wage premium varies with skill in Australia. This estimator allows 
us to identify sectoral differences in returns to a latent index of overall skill. We find no evidence 
to suggest that the public sector wage premium varies with skill. This suggests that if low skill 
public sector workers receive a wage premium, it is no larger than that of high skill workers. This 
is despite the typical results of quantile regressions, which suggest that the premium is usually 
much larger at the bottom of the wage distribution. How can these results be reconciled? The 
quantile regression results could be explained by greater variance in private sector wages for a 
                                                           
14 The fixed effects models were estimated using the user-written Stata module –xtivreg2– (Schaffer, 2005) 19 
 
given level of skill. Another explanation is that the compressed wage profile of the public sector 
induces the best workers (on unobserved skills) to join the public sector in low wage occupations, 
vice versa in high wage occupations. This would be consistent with the recent work of Bargain & 
Melly (2008) for France, who use a fixed effects quantile regression approach. Whilst they are 
unable to account for differences in returns to unobserved skills, they find that the apparent 
variation in the French public sector wage premium across the wage distribution is mostly 
explained by sector selection on unobserved skills. French public sector workers were found to 
have higher unobserved skills at the bottom of the wage distribution, while the opposite is true at 
the top of the distribution.  
Our findings suggest that caution should be taken before inferring (from quantile regression) that 
low skill public sector workers are considerably overpaid. If the public sector does attract the best 
workers (on unobservables) in low skill occupations, this is likely to translate to higher 
productivity. The finding also calls into question the ability of governments to use wage setting 
policies to achieve redistributive goals. If, for instance, governments aim to provide a wage 
premium to public sector workers in low wage occupations, it may simply be inducing the best 
workers (on unobserved characteristics) to join the public sector. 
Our results are consistent with concerns over the ability of the public sector to retain highly skilled 
workers. When compared to the results of Cai & Liu (2011), the lack of a public sector wage 
penalty  for high skill workers in our study suggests that  the best workers  (on unobserved 
characteristics) in high wage occupations select into the private sector. 
Further research is required to investigate these issues, since this literature has paid insufficient 
attention to sectoral differences in unobserved skills (and in their returns).  In particular,  the 
standard errors for ψ must be taken into account. The 95% confidence intervals do not rule out 
moderate sectoral differences in returns to skills. It would thus be useful to conduct related 
studies using other data sources. 
We also find that the average Australian public sector employee is paid slightly more than he or 
she would be paid in the private sector. The preferred  estimates of this public sector wage 
premium are 4% for men and 6% for women, though the estimate is not statistically significant for 
men. This does not include the value of benefits such as superannuation and paid maternity leave 
which are also more generous in the public sector. This positive average premium is consistent 
with most of the international literature on this topic. It may result from the higher rates of 
unionisation in the public sector. It is also possible that this ‘premium’ compensates public sector 
workers for unfavourable working environments. However, the evidence for Australia suggests 20 
 
little or no sectoral difference in levels of work-related stress or job satisfaction (Lewig and 
Dollard 2001; Macklin et al. 2006).  
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Table 1 Sample selection (number of observations) 
   Men  Women  Pooled 
Job changers between any consecutive waves  3116  3043  6159 
   with missing data  149  225  374 
   outliers  103  88  191 
   changed education  161  210  371 
Final sample  2703  2520  5223 
 
Table 2 Sample means – job changers* 
   Men     Women 
Variable  Public  Private  Sector 
Movers 
   Public  Private  Sector 
Movers 
ln wage  3.26  3.12  3.18    3.21  2.98  3.13 
Experience (years)  15.4  14.5  14.8    15.4  12.6  14.1 
Education               
   University degree  0.46  0.17  0.34    0.52  0.21  0.43 
   Trade  0.22  0.38  0.29    0.19  0.29  0.23 
   Year 12  0.16  0.21  0.18    0.16  0.26  0.19 
   less than Year 12  0.16  0.24  0.19    0.13  0.24  0.16 
Casual  0.17  0.27  0.20    0.21  0.37  0.26 
Shift / irregular  0.20  0.23  0.22    0.18  0.26  0.23 
Occupation               
   Managers  0.06  0.10  0.03    0.05  0.07  0.06 
   Professionals  0.39  0.15  0.32    0.48  0.17  0.38 
   Technicians and Trades Workers  0.13  0.25  0.19    0.02  0.05  0.02 
   Community and Personal Service Workers  0.12  0.05  0.12    0.14  0.16  0.18 
   Clerical and Administrative Workers  0.15  0.08  0.13    0.27  0.29  0.28 
   Sales Workers  0.02  0.10  0.05    0.01  0.17  0.04 
   Machinery Operators and Drivers  0.04  0.13  0.05    0.00  0.01  0.01 
   Labourers And Related Workers  0.09  0.16  0.11    0.02  0.08  0.03 
Tenure (years) with employer at t-1   3.50  2.74  3.62    3.19  2.41  2.87 
Changed occupation between observations  0.53  0.48  0.57    0.41  0.46  0.46 
Sample size  300  2,403  294     479  2,041  461 
* The sample is limited to that of the main analysis as reported in the text. ‘Public’ denotes all public sector 
employees who changed employer since the previous observation. ‘Private’ denotes all private sector 
employees who changed employer since the previous observation. ‘Sector movers’ denotes all employees who 
changed employer and sector since the previous observation. 25 
 
Table 3 Sample means – all employees* 
   Men     Women 
Variable  Public  Private  Sector 
Movers 
   Public  Private  Sector 
Movers 
ln wage  3.37  3.12  3.18    3.26  2.97  3.13 
Experience (years)  23.1  17.5  14.8    19.6  14.6  14.1 
Education               
   University degree  0.42  0.18  0.34    0.50  0.20  0.43 
   Trade  0.34  0.36  0.29    0.23  0.26  0.23 
   Year 12  0.11  0.18  0.18    0.11  0.22  0.19 
   less than Year 12  0.13  0.27  0.19    0.16  0.32  0.16 
Casual  0.08  0.22  0.20    0.14  0.35  0.26 
Shift / irregular  0.24  0.26  0.22    0.22  0.27  0.23 
Occupation               
   Managers  0.11  0.13  0.03    0.06  0.07  0.06 
   Professionals  0.37  0.15  0.32    0.51  0.17  0.38 
   Technicians and Trades Workers  0.12  0.24  0.19    0.02  0.05  0.02 
   Community and Personal Service Workers  0.14  0.05  0.12    0.17  0.15  0.18 
   Clerical and Administrative Workers  0.14  0.07  0.13    0.20  0.25  0.28 
   Sales Workers  0.01  0.09  0.05    0.01  0.19  0.04 
   Machinery Operators and Drivers  0.06  0.13  0.05    0.00  0.01  0.01 
   Labourers And Related Workers  0.06  0.15  0.11    0.03  0.10  0.03 
Tenure (years) with employer at t-1   10.57  4.92  3.62    7.93  3.82  2.87 
Sample size  5,714  21,419  294     7,987  19,120  461 
* ‘Public’ denotes all public sector employees. ‘Private’ denotes all private sector employees. ‘Sector movers’ 
denotes all employees who changed employer and sector since the previous observation. 
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Table 4 Mean wages of public sector leavers and joiners 
   Males  Females  Pooled 
 
mean ln wage 
Leavers  3.213  3.141  3.168 
Joiners  3.110  3.071  3.087 
Difference  0.103  0.070  0.081 
Standard error of difference  0.048  0.030  0.026 
p-value of difference  0.030  0.012  0.002 
       
 
mean change in ln wage 
Leavers  -0.002  -0.009  -0.006 
Joiners  0.082  0.093  0.089 
Other job changers (not sector switchers)  0.053  0.042  0.048 
       
 
Number of observations 
Leavers  117  198  315 
Joiners  177  263  440 
Other job changers (not sector switchers)  2,409  2,059  4,468 
* The upper panel shows the mean log wage for public sector leavers and joiners, where for each switcher, the 
log wage is averaged across one public sector observation and one private sector observation (the observations 
immediately before and after the sector switch). 27 
 
Table 5 GMM estimates of wage equations* 
   Men  Women  Pooled 
   coefficient  SE  coefficient  SE  coefficient  SE 
Constant effect (δ )  0.044  0.021  0.042  0.024  0.052  0.014 
Returns to time invariant skills 
in public sector (ψ) 
0.954  0.146  1.118  0.159  0.960  0.104 
Returns to varying 
characteristics 
           
   Casual  0.062  0.014  0.066  0.013  0.063  0.009 
   Shift Work  0.010  0.014  -0.017  0.015  -0.003  0.010 
R
t δ   3.112  0.006  2.992  0.008  3.055  0.004 
R
t 1 − δ   3.060  0.007  2.949  0.008  3.008  0.005 
             
Hansen overidentification 
statistic 
16.616  24.146  17.350 
   (p-value)  (0.277)  (0.044)  (0.238) 
Sample size  2703  2520  5223 
 * The dependent variable is the log wage. The sample is limited to that of the main analysis as reported in the 
text. The Hansen overidentification test statistic follows a χ
2 distribution with 14 degrees of freedom. 
 
Table 6 Decomposition of Raw Average Wage Gap from GMM results 
   Men  Women  Pooled 
   Estimate  SE  Estimate  SE  Estimate  SE 
Public Sector Wage Premium:             
   constant effect (δ )  0.044  0.021  0.042  0.024  0.052  0.014 
   differences in returns to fixed    
…characteristics 
-0.005  0.015  0.017  0.022  -0.004  0.012 
   Total average wage premium  0.040  0.022  0.059  0.015  0.048  0.013 
                   
Effect of differences in characteristics:                  
   casual and shiftwork status  -0.006  0.002  -0.009  0.003  -0.007  0.001 
   fixed characteristics  0.110  0.022  0.176  0.016  0.132  0.013 
   Total effect of different 
…characteristics 
0.104  0.022  0.166  0.016  0.124  0.013 
             
Unadjusted Wage Gap  0.144     0.225     0.172    28 
 
Table 7 Sensitivity Tests of Main Results 




premium  SE 
Unrestricted returns to casual and shift         
   Men  0.034  0.026  1.021  0.172  0.047  0.022 
   Women  0.011  0.034  1.262  0.212  0.062  0.015 
NLIV             
   Men  0.048  0.020  0.954  0.135  0.043  0.022 
   Women  0.039  0.021  1.174  0.153  0.063  0.016 
ITGMM             
   Men  0.044  0.021  0.954  0.145  0.040  0.022 
   Women  0.044  0.023  1.106  0.157  0.059  0.015 
Weighted             
   Men  0.020  0.024  0.974  0.163  0.018  0.023 
   Women  0.036  0.027  1.190  0.200  0.060  0.018 
Waves 1 & 2             
   Men  0.118  0.041  0.601  0.172  0.035  0.064 
   Women  0.003  0.059  1.815  0.375  0.108  0.027 
Waves 2 & 3             
   Men  0.011  0.079  1.771  0.587  0.084  0.045 
   Women  0.025  0.064  1.582  0.411  0.105  0.033 
Waves 3 & 4             
   Men  0.050  0.050  0.877  0.194  0.044  0.057 
   Women  0.082  0.038  0.874  0.192  0.065  0.037 
Waves 4 & 5             
   Men  0.036  0.039  1.415  0.244  0.045  0.031 
   Women  -0.011  0.067  1.059  0.332  -0.003  0.038 
Waves 5 & 6             
   Men  0.030  0.036  0.694  0.093  -0.042  0.070 
   Women  0.062  0.043  0.937  0.161  0.050  0.042 
Waves 6 & 7             
   Men  0.048  0.046  1.104  0.199  0.053  0.044 
   Women  0.027  0.038  0.778  0.227  -0.013  0.052 
Waves 7 & 8             
   Men  -0.108  0.129  2.494  0.841  0.024  0.042 
   Women  -0.008  0.060  1.530  0.454  0.055  0.027 
Nonlinear Least Squares             
   Men  0.047  0.020  0.957  0.042  0.043  0.020 
   Women  0.059  0.016  0.936  0.040  0.050  0.016 
 29 
 
Table 8 Estimated Average Public Sector Wage Premium - Comparison to other Methods 









premium  SE  N 
OLS  0.037  0.011  25,178     0.065  0.008  25,116 
Oaxaca decomposition  0.050  0.007  25,178     0.053  0.006  25,116 
Fixed Effects  0.032  0.010  19,171    0.040  0.008  18,294 
First Difference (full controls)  0.018  0.011  18,294    0.020  0.009  17,085 
First Difference (limited controls)  0.024  0.012  17,736    0.022  0.009  16,849 
First Difference (job changers only)  0.046  0.020  2,703    0.054  0.007  2,520 
Quasi-Difference (preferred model)  0.040  0.022  2,703     0.059  0.015  2,520 
 30 
 











































* The sample is limited to that of the main analysis as reported in the text. ‘Public’ denotes all public sector 
employees who changed employer since the previous observation. ‘Private’ denotes all private sector 
employees who changed employer since the previous observation. ‘Sector movers’ denotes all employees who 
changed employer and sector since the previous observation. 31 
 











































* ‘Public’ denotes all public sector employees. ‘Private’ denotes all private sector employees. ‘Sector movers’ 
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* The population is limited to sector switchers. For each switcher, the log wage is averaged across one public 
sector observation and one private sector observation (the observations immediately before and after the 
sector switch). 